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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On December 3, 2007, Judge Carol Higbee of the Superior Court of New Jersey 
issued a memorandum of decision that stated, “[a] practice has come to the Court’s 
attention that appears to have the potential to create manifest injustice upon the 
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rights of the People of the United States to file in the State Courts cases that 
traditionally belong in State Courts.”1  Judge Higbee further characterized the 
practice in question as a “strategic-end run” around the state courts and contrary to 
the “long standing understanding of the law.”2  She concluded her decision with a 
promise to “raise the issue on a wider basis . . . with the . . . proper committees of the 
Supreme Court of the State of New Jersey.”3  The practice that Judge Higbee so 
strongly denounced has been called pre-service removal.4  It is a procedural 
maneuver utilized by defendants in civil actions and best explained by the following 
hypothetical lawsuit.  
To begin, suppose a citizen of Ohio files a lawsuit against two corporations 
seeking damages in excess of $75,000.  One corporation is a citizen of New Jersey 
and the other is a citizen of Delaware.  Diversity jurisdiction exists under this 
scenario because the defendants are not citizens of Ohio and the amount in 
controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000.5  As such, the federal district courts have 
original jurisdiction over this action,6 which permits the plaintiff to file this lawsuit 
in federal court.  Imagine, however, the plaintiff exercises the option to file this 
lawsuit in state court.  Specifically, this hypothetical corporation files the lawsuit in 
a state court of New Jersey.  Named defendants typically may remove an action from 
state court to federal court when diversity jurisdiction exists.7  There is one 
exception, however, to that rule.8 
The exception, known as the forum-defendant rule,9 prohibits removal based on 
diversity jurisdiction when one “of the parties in interest properly joined and served 
as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”10  It seems 
then that removal in our hypothetical case would be prohibited because one of the 
named defendants is a citizen of New Jersey, the forum state.  Nevertheless, a closer 
look at the language of the forum-defendant rule reveals an exception to its 
applicability.  Specifically, the statute requires a “properly joined and served” in-
state defendant.11  
                                                          
 
1
 In re Bextra/Celebrex, No. ATL-L-8367-05MT (N.J. Super. Ct. Dec. 03, 2007), 
available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/mass-tort/archive/bextra-celebrex/MOD_ 
regarding_Track_Assignment_Notice.pdf. 
 
2
 Id. 
 
3
 Id.  
 
4
 For a discussion on possible congressional solutions to the issue of pre-service removal, 
see Jordan Bailey, Comment, Giving State Courts the Ol’ Slip: Should a Defendant Be 
Allowed to Remove an Otherwise Irremovable Case to Federal Court Solely Because Removal 
Was Made Before Any Defendant Is Served?, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 181, 200 (2009).  
 
5
 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006).  See also discussion infra Part II.A.1. 
 
6
 See id. § 1332(a). 
 
7
 See id. § 1441(a). 
 
8
 See id. § 1441(b). 
 
9
 See, e.g., Ethington v. Gen. Elec. Co., 575 F. Supp. 2d 855, 858 (N.D. Ohio 2008). 
 
10
 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).  
 
11
 Id. 
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One could thus argue that removal based on diversity jurisdiction is proper when 
executed before the plaintiff has “served” the in-state defendant.  Moreover, indeed 
numerous defendants have avoided the forum-defendant rule with that approach.12  
As evidenced by Judge Higbee’s blistering opinion,13 however, not all courts agree 
that pre-service removal is proper.  In fact, the issue has resulted in a split among a 
number of the United States district courts.14 
District courts on one side of the split have authorized pre-service removal 
because the plain language of the forum-defendant rule only prohibits removal when 
the in-state defendant has been “served.”15  Some district courts on the other side of 
the split have rejected pre-service removal by creating an exception to the 
applicability of the “properly joined and served” requirement of the forum-defendant 
rule.16  Finally, other district courts have rejected pre-service removal by 
characterizing the maneuver as an absurd result that Congress could not have 
intended.17  
This Note will examine all sides of the district court split and ultimately argue in 
favor of the plain language of the forum-defendant rule to permit pre-service 
removal.  Part II of this Note surveys the general removal doctrine, general 
principles of statutory interpretation, and the history of the absurd-result principle.  
Part III then discusses the district court split in depth by setting forth the arguments 
on both sides of the issue.  Part IV of this Note contemplates the flawed arguments 
against pre-service removal.  Part V then concludes with a discussion on why the 
plain language argument in favor of pre-service removal is the appropriate resolution 
of the district court split.  
II.  HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
A.  The General Removal Doctrine 
The general removal doctrine is a creature of statute.18  “It has been a part of 
American jurisprudence since the execution of the Judiciary Act of 1789.”19  The 
general removal statute specifies that “any civil action brought in a State court of 
which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be 
removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court.”20  In short, an 
                                                          
 
12
 See, e.g., cases cited infra note 98.  
 
13
 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.  
 
14
 See discussion infra Part III.A.  
 
15
 See discussion infra Part III.A.2.a. 
 
16
 See discussion infra Part III.A.1.a. 
 
17
 See discussion infra Part III.A.1.b. 
 
18
 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-52 (2006).  
 
19
 Sullivan v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 640, 644 (D.N.J. 2008) (citations 
omitted). 
 
20
 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).  
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action may be removed from state court to federal court if it could have originally 
been filed in federal court.21  
Two actions commonly removed to federal court are those based on federal 
question jurisdiction22 and those based on diversity of citizenship.23  Although the 
district courts have original jurisdiction under both scenarios,24 section 1441(b) of 
the general removal statute sets forth separate removal guidelines for each.  First, an 
action removed under federal question jurisdiction, that is, one “founded on a claim 
or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be 
removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties.”25  In 
diversity cases, however, section 1441(b) “imposes another condition above the 
requirements of original diversity jurisdiction.”26  It states “[a]ny other such action 
shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served 
as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”27  This 
provision, also known as the forum-defendant rule,28 precludes removal of a diverse 
case from state court to federal court when one of the defendants, “properly joined 
and served,” is a citizen of the state where the action is filed.29  Although there are 
other statutes that provide the right of removal,30 this Note will focus on removal 
under diversity jurisdiction and the forum-defendant rule.  
1.  Diversity Jurisdiction 
Diversity jurisdiction exists when “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or 
value of $75,000 . . . and is between . . . citizens of different States.”31  The amount 
in controversy requirement is established by a “fair reading” of the complaint.32  A 
party’s citizenship is determined by looking at where that party is domiciled, that is, 
the place where the party resides with “an intention to remain there indefinitely.”33  
                                                          
 
21
 See 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 1376 (2010) (citing City of Chi. v. Int’l Coll. of 
Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997)). 
 
22
 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“[T]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil 
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).  
 
23
 See id. § 1332.  
 
24
 See id. §§ 1331-32.  
 
25
 Id. § 1441(b).  
 
26
 Bivins v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 09-1087, 2009 WL 2496518, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 
10, 2009). 
 
27
 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006).  
 
28
 See, e.g., Ethington v. Gen. Elec. Co., 575 F. Supp. 2d 855, 858 (N.D. Ohio 2008). 
 
29
 See, e.g., Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., Inc., 456 F.3d 933, 935 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006).  
 
30
 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE—CIVIL § 107.02 (3d ed. 
2009). 
 
31
 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2006).  
 
32
 See, e.g., Hayes v. Equitable Energy Res. Co., 266 F.3d 560, 573 (6th Cir. 2001).  
 
33
 Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 250 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).  
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Corporations have dual citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction and 
removal.34  A corporation is a citizen of any state where it is incorporated and the 
state where they have their principal place of business.35  The Supreme Court 
recently concluded in Hertz Corp. v. Friend that the appropriate test for determining 
a corporation’s principal place of business is the “nerve center” test.36  Under that 
test, a corporation’s principal place of business “refers to the place where the 
corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s 
activities.”37  It noted the “‘nerve center’ will typically be found at a corporation’s 
headquarters.”38 
A removing party must still account for the removal prohibition contained in the 
forum-defendant rule before it can successfully remove a case under diversity 
jurisdiction.  The forum-defendant rule precludes removal when any of the parties in 
interest “properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which 
such action is brought.”39  The rationale behind this rule is straightforward: “[g]iven 
that the purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to provide litigants with an unbiased 
forum by protecting out-of-state litigants from local prejudices, it makes no sense to 
allow an in-state defendant to take advantage of removal.”40  The removal process 
thus can begin once the defendant has established that none of the “properly joined 
and served” defendants is a resident of the forum state. 
2.  The Removal Process 
The process for removal is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1446.  It states that “[a] 
defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil action . . . from a State court 
shall file in the district court . . . [where] such action is pending a notice of removal 
                                                          
 
34
 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2006).  
 
35
 Id. 
 
36
 Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010).  In Hertz, two California residents sued 
their former employer in state court, alleging violations of California’s wage and hour laws.  
Id. at 1186.  The defendant corporation sought removal to federal court, claiming that its 
principal place of business was in New Jersey.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the district court’s conclusion that defendant’s principal place of business was in 
California.  Id. at 1186-87.  It relied on the “business activity” test to determine that Hertz was 
a corporate citizen of California.  Id. at 1187.  The case was remanded to the state courts.  Id. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari emphasizing the need for judicial administration of a 
jurisdictional statute to remain as simple as possible.  Id. at 1186.  
 
37
 Id. at 1186. 
 
38
 Id.  
 
39
 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006).  It is worth noting that the original removal statute did not 
contain the “properly joined and served” requirement, which was added in 1948 when 
Congress enacted Title 28.  See discussion infra Part III.A.1.b. 
 
40
 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE—CIVIL § 107.14 (3d ed. 
2009).  See also Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., Inc., 456 F.3d 933, 940 (9th Cir. 2006) (observing 
that “[t]he purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to provide a federal forum for out-of-state 
litigants where they are free from prejudice in favor of a local litigant,” but that “[t]he need for 
such protection is absent . . . in cases where the defendant is a citizen of the state in which the 
case is brought.” (citation omitted)). 
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. . . containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal.”41  
Additionally, “[t]he notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed 
within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of 
a copy of the initial pleading.”42  
At one point, courts were uncertain whether receipt of the complaint unattended 
by formal service was sufficient to start the thirty-day removal period.43  The 
Supreme Court resolved the issue in Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, 
Inc.44  There the Court held that formal service of process is required to trigger the 
thirty-day removal period under section 1446(b).45  The Court grounded its holding 
in the “bedrock principle [that] . . . [a]n individual or entity named as a defendant is 
not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a 
court’s authority, by formal process.”46  
The final wrinkle in the removal process emerges when there are multiple 
defendants to an action.  All defendants generally must join in the notice of removal 
to effectuate that action properly.47  Accordingly, a notice of removal is considered 
procedurally defective and invalid if it fails to include or explain the non-joinder of a 
codefendant.48  This requirement may be satisfied, however, if the defendants that 
did not join in the notice of removal file a written statement to the court indicating 
that they consent to removal.49  The removing defendant(s) must then give prompt 
written notice of the procedurally sound removal to all adverse parties and “file a 
copy of the notice with the clerk of such State court, which shall effect the removal 
and the State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded.”50 
3.  Remand and Other Post-Removal Procedures 
A district court may engage in a number of procedures after a notice of removal 
has been filed.  First, the district court “may issue all necessary orders and process to 
bring before it all proper parties whether served by process issued by the State court 
or otherwise.”51  Additionally, “[i]t may require the removing party to file with its 
clerk copies of all records and proceedings in such State court or may cause the same 
                                                          
 
41
 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).  
 
42
 Id. § 1446(b) (emphasis added).  
 
43
 See Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999). 
 
44
 Id. 
 
45
 Id. at 347-48. 
 
46
 Id.  
 
47
 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE—CIVIL § 107.41 
(Procedures After Removal) (3d ed. 2009) (citing Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Martin, 
178 U.S. 245, 248 (1900)). 
 
48
 Id. (citing Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Allison, 756 F. Supp. 290, 291 (N.D. 
Tex. 1991)). 
 
49
 Id. (citing Burr ex rel. Burr v. Toyota Motor Credit Co., 478 F. Supp. 2d 432, 440 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006)). 
 
50
 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (2006).  
 
51
 Id. § 1447(a).  
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to be brought before it by writ of certiorari issued to such State court.”52  The most 
significant post-removal procedure that a district court may engage in, however, is 
whether to remand the action back to state court.  
The provisions for remand are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).  The first 
provision within section 1447(c) is directed at plaintiffs.  It specifies, “[a] motion to 
remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal 
under section 1446(a).”53  The second provision within section 1447(c) is directed at 
the courts.  It specifies, “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the 
district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded . . . [and] 
[t]he State court may thereupon proceed with such case.”54  
The plaintiff ordinarily is the party that moves the court to remand a case.55  A 
plaintiff may make a motion to remand based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
if the court did not catch this defect on its own.56  It is more likely, however, that a 
plaintiff will move the court to remand the action based on a procedural defect in the 
removal process.57  
A procedural defect is any defect other than a lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.58  An example would be a notice of removal filed after the 30-day time 
period set forth in section 1446(b).59  The failure of all defendants to join in the 
notice of removal likewise qualifies as a procedural defect.60  The removing party 
bears the burden of proof that removal was proper when a procedural defect is 
alleged.61  A court may find itself interpreting the various provisions of the removal 
doctrine to correctly decide the outcome of a motion to remand.  The following 
section discusses the general principles of statutory interpretation.  
B.  General Principles of Statutory Interpretation 
The courts of the United States are charged with the responsibility of interpreting 
and applying the laws enacted by Congress.62  “When an authoritative written text of 
the law has been adopted, the particular language of that text is always the starting 
                                                          
 
52
 Id. § 1447(b).  
 
53
 Id. § 1447(c). 
 
54
 Id. 
 
55
 MOORE ET AL., supra note 47. 
 
56
 Id. 
 
57
 Id. 
 
58
 Id. (citing In re Allstate Ins. Co., 8 F.3d 219, 221 (5th Cir. 1993)). 
 
59
 Id. (citing Wilson v. General Motors Corp., 888 F.2d 779, 781 (11th Cir. 1989)). 
 
60
 Id. (citing McMahon v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., 150 F.3d 651, 653-54 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(failure of all defendants to join in removal is procedural defect)); see also id. (citing Roe v. 
O’Donohue, 38 F.3d 298, 301-02 (7th Cir. 1994)). 
 
61
 Id. (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also id. (citing 
Parker v. Brown, 570 F. Supp. 640, 642 (S.D. Ohio 1983)). 
 
62
 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 60 (2010) (citations omitted).  
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point on any question concerning the application of the law.”63  Where the language 
of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the courts should give those words their plain 
meaning in applying that law.64  Where statutory language is ambiguous, however, a 
court may interpret those words in a manner that they believe effectuates the will of 
the legislature.65  In this respect, “courts may examine the object sought to be 
attained by the statute, laws upon the same or similar subjects, and the consequences 
of a particular construction.”66  
At times, a court may be presented with extrinsic aids, such as the legislative 
history of a statute, to assist with interpretation.67  Indeed, the definition of 
“legislative history” reads, “[t]he background and events leading to the enactment of 
a statute, including hearings, committee reports, and floor debates.  Legislative 
history is sometimes recorded so that it can later be used to aid in interpreting the 
statute.”68  The Supreme Court recently confronted this issue in Exxon Mobil Corp. 
v. Allapattah Services Inc.69  
In that case, the Court was required to interpret the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 
to properly answer “whether a federal court in a diversity action may exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over additional plaintiffs whose claims do not satisfy the 
minimum amount-in-controversy requirement, provided the claims are part of the 
same case or controversy as the claims of plaintiffs who do allege a sufficient 
amount.”70  One side of the dispute argued that the legislative history of section 1367 
would show that Congress did not intend to grant supplemental jurisdiction over 
these additional plaintiffs whose claims do not satisfy the amount-in-controversy 
requirement.  The Court disagreed.  
Relying mainly on the text of the statute,71 the Court held that section 1367 does 
permit federal courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over additional plaintiffs 
not meeting the minimum amount-in-controversy requirement.72  In doing so, the 
Court set forth its position on the use of extrinsic aids in statutory interpretation 
when it declared, “the authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative 
history or any other extrinsic material.”73  The Court believed those materials were 
                                                          
 
63
 2A NORMAN SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45:1 (7th ed. 2009) 
(citation omitted).  
 
64
 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 124 (2010) (citing Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth, 
721 N.E.2d 1057 (Ohio 2000)). 
 
65
 See Id. § 113 (citing Brown v. Flowe, 507 S.E.2d 894 (N.C. 1998)). 
 
66
 See id. (citing U.S. v. James, 478 U.S. 597 (1986)). 
 
67
 See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005).  
 
68
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 919 (8th ed. 2004).   
 
69
 Exxon, 545 U.S. 546. 
 
70
 Id. at 549.  
 
71
 In addition to the text, the Court interprets section 1367 in light of other related statutory 
provisions and its established jurisprudence.  Id. at 567. 
 
72
 Id. at 549-50. 
 
73
 Id. at 568. 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss4/7
2010] PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND DENIED 915 
 
often unreliable and their use in statutory interpretation can become an “exercise in 
‘looking over a crown and picking out your friends.’”74 
Conversely, some courts have deviated from the plain language rule where a 
literal application of the words produces a result demonstrably at odds with the 
intention of its drafters.75  This exception, known as the absurd-result principle76 or 
absurdity doctrine,77 “authorizes a judge to ignore a statute’s plain words in order to 
avoid the outcome those words would require in a particular situation.”78  In such 
cases, one argues that “the intention of the drafters, rather than the strict language, 
controls.”79 
C.  A Brief History of Absurdity 
“From the earliest days of the Republic, the Supreme Court has subscribed to the 
idea that judges may deviate from even the clearest statutory text when a given 
application would otherwise produce ‘absurd’ results.”80  Even Supreme Court 
Justice Antonin Scalia, one of the better-known proponents of plain language 
interpretation,81 has accepted this principle.82  United States v. Kirby,83 one of the 
earliest Supreme Court cases broaching the subject,84 is a useful illustration of the 
principle in action.  
In Kirby, the grand jury of Gallatin County, Kentucky, issued two indictments 
against a mail carrier for murder.85  The circuit court of that county then issued 
                                                          
 
74
 Id. (citing Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 
1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983)). 
 
75
 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (citing Griffin v. 
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).  See also SINGER, supra note 63, § 46:4 
(citation omitted). 
 
76
 Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism: Defining the Absurd 
Result Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 127 (1994).  
 
77
 John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2003).  
 
78
 Dougherty, supra note 76, at 128. 
 
79
 See supra note 75.   
 
80
 Manning, supra note 77, at 2388 (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. 
L. REV. 953, 986 (1995)).  
 
81
 See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW (Amy Guttman ed., 1997).  
 
82
 Dougherty, supra note 76, at 128 (“[The absurd result principle] enjoys almost universal 
endorsement, even by those who are most critical of judicial discretion and most insistent that 
the words of the statute are the only legitimate basis of interpretation.”); see also id. (citing 
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(rejecting literal interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) because it would 
produce an absurd result) (other citations omitted)).  
 
83
 United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482 (1868).  
 
84
 “The absurd result principle . . . is seen in the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court 
as early as 1819.”  Dougherty, supra note 76, at 135 (citation omitted).  Kirby was decided in 
1868. 
 
85
 Kirby, 74 U.S. at 482.  
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010
916 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:907 
 
bench warrants upon those indictments and commanded Kirby, as sheriff of that 
county, to arrest the mail carrier and bring him before the court to answer the 
indictments.86  Kirby, accompanied by his posse, then entered the steamboat General 
Buell and arrested the mail carrier.87  For their effort, the District Court charged the 
sheriff and his posse under the ninth section of the act of Congress, of March 3, 
1825, which states, “that if any person shall knowingly and willfully obstruct or 
retard the passage of the mail, or of any driver or carrier, or of any horse or carriage 
carrying the same, he shall, upon conviction, for every such offence, pay a fine not 
exceeding one hundred dollars.”88  
The issue thus presented was whether the lawful arrest of a mail carrier, under a 
warrant issued by the local court, was the type of obstruction to the delivery of mail 
that Congress had intended to prevent when they enacted the statute.89  The lower 
court judges were split on the outcome.  Consequently, the case was certified to the 
Supreme Court for resolution.90  
The Supreme Court ultimately rejected the literal application of the statute.91  It 
reasoned, “[a]ll laws should receive a sensible construction.”  Furthermore, it will 
“be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language . . . [t]he reason 
of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter.”92  The Court concluded: 
The common sense of man approves the judgment mentioned by 
Puffendorf, that the Bolognian law which enacted, ‘that whoever drew 
blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity,’ did not 
extend to the surgeon who opened the vein of a person that fell down in 
the street in a fit.  The same common sense accepts the ruling, cited by 
Plowden, that the statute of 1st Edward II, which enacts that a prisoner 
who breaks prison shall be guilty of felony, does not extend to a prisoner 
who breaks out when the prison is on fire—‘for he is not to be hanged 
because he would not stay to be burnt.’  And we think that a like common 
sense will sanction the ruling we make, that the act of Congress which 
punishes the obstruction or retarding of the passage of the mail, or of its 
carrier, does not apply to a case of temporary detention of the mail caused 
by the arrest of the carrier upon an indictment for murder.93 
It has been suggested that the examples above from Puffendorf and Plowden, used 
by the Court to support its holding in Kirby, exist as “the nearest thing we have to a 
legal definition of absurdity.”94  Indeed, a troubling aspect of the principle is that 
                                                          
 
86
 Id. 
 
87
 Id. 
 
88
 Id. (citation omitted).  
 
89
 Kirby, 74 U.S. at 482. 
 
90
 Id. 
 
91
 Id. at 487. 
 
92
 Id. at 486-87. 
 
93
 Id. at 487. 
 
94
 Dougherty, supra note 76, at 139. 
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“[c]ases using or referring to the principle do not define absurdity, nor do they 
specify the kinds of situations where the principle should be applied.”95  
III.  PRE-SERVICE REMOVAL 
A.  The District Court Split 
As noted by district court Judge Dan Aaron Polster, “[t]he procedural and factual 
circumstances in most, if not all cases [of pre-service removal] are essentially 
identical.”96  Despite that uniformity, the federal district courts have not been 
uniform or consistent in resolving motions to remand that follow the pre-service 
removal maneuver.97  The issue dividing the district courts is whether a defendant 
may properly remove a case from state court to federal court based on diversity 
jurisdiction before the plaintiff serves a named in-state defendant, when it could not 
do so after service. 
Resolving the pre-service removal issue typically turns on how a particular 
district court interprets the “properly joined and served” language of the forum-
defendant rule.  Some courts have upheld pre-service removal because—by choosing 
the “properly joined and served” language—“Congress plainly intended to require 
service of the complaint . . . to trigger the preclusion of removal by the forum 
resident defendant in a diversity case.”98  Conversely, the courts favoring remand 
have rejected pre-service removal two ways.99  
                                                          
 
95
 Id. at 128.  
 
96
 Ethington v. Gen. Elec. Co., 575 F. Supp. 2d 855, 861 (N.D. Ohio 2008).   
 
97
 See cases cited infra notes 98, 101-02. 
 
98
 See, e.g., Bivins v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 09-1087, 2009 WL 2496518 (D.N.J. 
Aug. 10, 2009); Carman v. Bayer Corp., No. 5:08CV148, 2009 WL 1649715 (N.D. W. Va. 
June 10, 2009); Taylor v. Cottrell, Inc., No. 4:09CV536, 2009 WL 1657427 (E.D. Mo. June 
10, 2009); Copley v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 09-722, 2009 WL 1089663 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2009); 
North v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 600 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (M.D. Fla. 2009); Brake v. Reser’s 
Fine Foods, Inc., No. 4:08CV1879, 2009 WL 213013 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 28, 2009); Hutchins v. 
Bayer Corp., No. 08-640, 2009 WL 192468 (D. Del. Jan. 23, 2009); Vitatoe v. Mylan Pharm., 
Inc., No. 1:08cv85, 2008 WL 3540462 (N.D. W. Va. Aug. 13, 2008); Bolin v. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., No. 08-60523, 2008 WL 3286973 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2008); Valerio v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 08-60522, 2008 WL 3286976 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2008); In re 
Fosamax Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1789, 2008 WL 2940560 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2008); 
Masterson v. Apotex, Corp., No. 07-61665, 2008 WL 2047979 (S.D. Fla. May 13, 2008); 
Johnson v. Precision Airmotive, LLC, No. 4:07CV1695, 2007 WL 4289656 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 4, 
2007); Ripley v. Eon Labs Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 137 (D.N.J. 2007); Yocham v. Novartis 
Pharm. Corp., No. 07-1810, 2007 WL 2318493 (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2007); Cucci v. Edwards, 
510 F. Supp. 2d 479 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Waldon v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. C07-01988, 
2007 WL 1747128 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2007); Thomson v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 06-
6280, 2007 WL 1521138 (D.N.J. May 22, 2007); City of Ann Arbor Employees’ Retirement 
Sys. v. Gecht, No. C-06-7453, 2007 WL 760568 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2007); Frick v. Novartis 
Pharm. Corp., No. Civ. 05-5429, 2006 WL 454360 (D.N.J. Feb. 23, 2006); Massey v. Cassens 
& Sons, Inc., No. 05-CV-598-DRH, 2006 WL 381943 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 2006); Vanderwerf v. 
GlaxoSmithKline, PLC, No. 05-1315, 2005 WL 6151369 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 2005); Test 
Drilling Serv. Co. v. Hanor Co., 322 F. Supp. 2d 953 (C.D. Ill. 2003); Ott v. Consol. 
Freightways Corp. of Del., 213 F. Supp. 2d 662 (S.D. Miss. 2002); In re 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 2d 826 (S.D. Ind. 2002); Wensil v. E.I. Dupont De 
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1.  Motion to Remand Granted 
Two “related but slightly different line[s] of cases”100 have emerged from the 
courts favoring remand.  While the outcome is the same—the court rejects pre-
service removal and grants the plaintiff’s motion to remand back to state court—the 
reasoning for that outcome differs. Initially, the courts that favored remand, 
believing they were otherwise bound by the “properly joined and served” language, 
created a limited exception to that requirement.  That exception applied when the 
notice of removal was filed before the plaintiff had served any defendants.101  As the 
pre-service removal trend gained steam, however, courts favoring remand then 
turned to the more generally applicable absurd-result argument.102  Under this theory, 
pro-remand courts reject pre-service removal because Congress could not have 
intended that result when it drafted the forum-defendant rule.103  
a.  The No-Defendant-Served Exception 
Some district courts have concluded the “properly joined and served” 
requirement of the forum-defendant rule does not apply when the plaintiff has yet to 
serve any of the named defendants.104  Thus, the fact that the case was removed 
before the in-state defendant was “properly joined and served” is irrelevant.  Typical 
of these cases is Holmstrom v. Harad.105  
There, the plaintiff filed suit on April 25, 2005 in Illinois state court.106  In its 
complaint, it named twenty-eight defendants.  Two of the twenty-eight defendants 
were residents of Illinois, the forum state.107  On May 5, 2005, counsel for the 
plaintiff contacted the attorney for one of the named defendants, Peterson, regarding 
a possible waiver of service.108  The next day, without further discussion of the 
                                                          
Nemours and Co., 792 F. Supp. 447 (D.S.C. 1992); Republic W. Ins. Co. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 765 
F. Supp. 628 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
 
99
 See discussion infra Parts III.A.1.a-b. 
 
100
 Ethington, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 864.  
 
101
 See, e.g., Holmstrom v. Harad, No. 05-C-2714, 2005 WL 1950672 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 
2005); Recognition Commc’n, Inc. v. Am. Auto. Ass’n, Inc., No. 3:97-CV-0945-P, 1998 WL 
119528 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 1998). 
 
102
 See, e.g., Ethington, 575 F. Supp. 2d 855; Sullivan v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 575 F. 
Supp. 2d 640 (D.N.J. 2008); Allen v. GlaxoSmithKline, PLC, No. 07-5045, 2008 WL 
2247067 (E.D. Pa. May 30, 2008); DeAngelo-Shuayto v. Organon USA Inc., No. 07-2923, 
2007 WL 4365311 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2007); Fields v. Organon USA Inc., No. 07-2922, 2007 
WL 4365312 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2007); Vivas v. The Boeing Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 726 (N.D. Ill. 
2007). 
 
103
 See cases cited supra note 102. 
 
104
 See, e.g., Recognition Commc’n, Inc., 1998 WL 119528; Holmstrom, 2005 WL 
1950672. 
 
105
 Holmstrom, 2005 WL 1950672.  
 
106
 Id. at *1.  
 
107
 Id. 
 
108
 Id. 
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waiver, Peterson, a citizen of Ohio, removed the case to federal court under 28 
U.S.C. § 1441 and 28 U.S.C. § 1332.109  
On June 6, the plaintiff filed a motion to remand.  It argued Peterson’s removal, 
based on diversity jurisdiction, was improper because the presence of the two Illinois 
defendants triggered the removal prohibition contained in the forum-defendant 
rule.110  Peterson countered that removal of the case was proper because the two in-
state defendants had not been “served” at the time of removal as required by the 
“properly joined and served” language of the forum-defendant rule.111  The court 
acknowledged the existence of cases where an unserved in-state defendant did not 
defeat removal.112  In those cases, the plaintiff had served the removing defendants 
before the notice of removal was filed.113  In Holmstrom, however, the plaintiff had 
not served any of the named defendants at the time of removal.114  
The court thus was presented with an issue that had “received little treatment in 
the federal courts: whether, under section 1441(b), the citizenship of a forum 
defendant defeats removal when, prior to removal, no defendant has been served or 
otherwise appeared.”115  Answering in the affirmative, the court declared the “joined 
and served” requirement of the forum-defendant rule aims “to prevent a plaintiff 
from blocking removal by joining as a defendant a resident party against whom it 
does not intend to proceed, and whom it does not even serve.”116  It maintained, 
however, that the protection afforded by this requirement only applies to those non-
forum defendants already served at the time of removal: 
Once served, a defendant may immediately remove an otherwise 
removable case without regard to the unserved forum defendant, but the 
protection afforded by the “joined and served” requirement is wholly 
unnecessary for an unserved non-forum defendant [since] . . . the non-
forum defendant stands on equal footing as the forum-defendant [and] 
[n]either defendant in that scenario is obligated to appear in court.117  
Thus, the citizenship of the unserved in-state defendants defeats removal because the 
“joined and served” requirement did not apply at that early stage.118  
                                                          
 
109
 Id. 
 
110
 See id. 
 
111
 Id. at *2.  
 
112
 Id. at *1 (citing McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 813 n.2 (6th Cir. 2001); Stan Winston 
Creatures, Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 177, 180-81 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Ott v. 
Consol. Freightways Corp., 213 F. Supp. 2d 662, 665 (S.D. Miss. 2002); Maple Leaf Bakery 
v. Raychem Corp., No. 99 C 6948, 1999 WL 1101326, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 1999)).  
 
113
 Holmstrom, 2005 WL 1950672, at *1.  
 
114
 Id.  
 
115
 Id.  
 
116
 Id. at *2 (citing Stan Winston Creatures, 314 F. Supp. 2d at 181).   
 
117
 Holmstrom, 2005 WL 1950672, at *2 (citing Murphy Bros. Inc. v. Michetti Pipe 
Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1999)). 
 
118
 Holmstrom, 2005 WL 1950672, at *2. 
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b.  The Absurd-Result Argument 
The current trend among the courts favoring remand is to reject pre-service 
removal via the absurd-result principle.119  Under this theory, courts concede that the 
“properly joined and served” language of the forum-defendant rule permits pre-
service removal.120  They look past that language, however, to avoid a result that 
they believe Congress could not have intended.121  In their view, modern technology, 
such as electronic docket monitoring, has created a “loophole” in the antiquated 
language of the statute.122  Therefore, ignoring the “properly joined and served” 
language under these circumstances is justified.  Additionally, the absurd-result 
courts set forth a number of policy arguments in favor of remand.123  A 
comprehensive example of these cases is Sullivan v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals.124 
In Sullivan, the plaintiff, a citizen of Ohio, sued the defendant, Novartis 
Pharmaceuticals (“Novartis”), in New Jersey state court for alleged injuries caused 
by using a Novartis product.125  Novartis, a citizen of New Jersey, removed the case 
under diversity jurisdiction to federal court before the plaintiff could effectuate 
service.126  The plaintiff then filed a motion to remand the case back to state court.127  
The plaintiff argued that removal was improper because the presence of an in-
state defendant—Novartis—prohibits removal under the forum-defendant rule.128  
Novartis argued that the case was properly removed despite the forum-defendant rule 
because the in-state defendant had not been “served” as the plain language of the 
rule requires.129  The plaintiff argued that “applying the plain meaning of section 
1441(b), and allowing Novartis—a forum defendant—to avoid the forum defendant 
rule merely because it had not yet been served at the time it filed the Notice, would 
amount to an absurd result, demonstrably at odds with Congressional intent.”130  The 
court found this argument persuasive. 
Notwithstanding a split among its own prior decisions on the issue,131 the federal 
district court granted the plaintiff’s motion to remand the case back to New Jersey 
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 See cases cited supra note 98. 
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 See cases cited supra note 98. 
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 See cases cited supra note 98. 
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 See cases cited supra note 98.  
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 See cases cited supra note 98. 
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 Sullivan v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 640 (D.N.J. 2008). 
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 Id. at 641.  
 
126
 Id. 
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 Id.  
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 See id. at 641-42.  
 
129
 Id. 
 
130
 Id. at 642.  
 
131
 Id. at 642-43 (“In Fields v. Organon USA Inc., the court addressed precisely this issue, 
finding that the application of the plain meaning of section 1441(b) led to a result inconsistent 
with the intent of Congress.  The court held that a defendant ‘is subject to the restrictions of 
section 1441(b) regardless of whether it had been properly served at the time of removal.’  
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state court.132  In doing so, it applied the absurd-result principle.  The court thus 
“look[ed] beyond the language of the statute in order to avoid an absurd and bizarre 
result, and in order to give effect to the purpose of the forum-defendant rule and the 
‘properly joined and served’ language.”133 
Crucial to the court’s decision was its belief that “Congress added ‘the properly 
joined and served’ requirement in order to prevent a plaintiff from blocking removal 
by joining as a defendant a resident party against whom it does not intend to 
proceed, and whom it does not even serve.”134  The court initially noted that the 
original removal statute did not contain the “properly joined and served” 
requirement.135  Rather, Congress added it in 1948 when it enacted Title 28.136  
Accordingly, the court “conducted a thorough examination of the published 
legislative history regarding the 1948 changes to Title 28, including review of all 
legislative materials available in the Third Circuit libraries in Newark and 
Philadelphia and the DC Circuit library in Washington.”137  Despite these efforts, it 
failed to locate a “specific statement from Congress or the advisory Committee on 
Revision of the Judicial Code . . . regarding the addition of the ‘properly joined and 
served’ language.”138 
This lack of congressional guidance,139 however, did not discourage the court 
from reaching its desired conclusion.  On the contrary, it asserted that the underlying 
purpose of the “properly joined and served” language was “abundantly clear in light 
                                                          
Several district courts have come to the opposite conclusion, including this court.  In Frick, 
we found that the language of section 1441 was unambiguous, and that there was no clear 
indication that application of the plain meaning would result in an outcome demonstrably at 
odds with the will of provision’s drafters.” (citations omitted)).   
 
132
 Sullivan, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 653-54. 
 
133
 Id. at 643.  
 
134
 Id. at 645.  See also Ethington v. Gen Elec. Co., 575 F. Supp. 2d 855, 861 (N.D. Ohio 
2008) (“Congress intended the ‘joined and served’ part of the forum defendant rule to prevent 
gamesmanship by plaintiffs, who might name an in-state defendant against whom he or she 
does not have a valid claim in a complaint filed in state court to defeat otherwise permissible 
removal by the non-forum defendant.” (citation omitted)); Stan Winston Creatures, Inc. v. 
Toys “R” Us, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 177, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The purpose of the ‘joined 
and served’ requirement is to prevent a plaintiff from blocking removal by joining as a 
defendant a resident party against whom it does not even serve.”). 
 
135
 Sullivan, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 644 (citation omitted).  
 
136
 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 114 (1940); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1948)).  
 
137
 Id.  
 
138
 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1948) reviser’s notes; H.R. Rep. No. 80-308 (1947), as 
reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.S., Special Pamphlet: Title 28 at 1692; S. Rep. No. 80-1559 
(1948), as reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.S., Special Pamphlet: Title 28 at 1675; Letter from Hon. 
Albert B. Maris, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and 
Chair of the Committee, to Mildrim Thompson, Jr., Esq. (May 10, 1946)).  
 
139
 Sullivan also noted that “the Circuit Courts have provided little guidance on the 
statutory interpretation of the ‘properly joined and served’ language of section 1441(b), owing 
to the fact that the orders of district courts made pursuant to section 1441, generally are not 
reviewable.”  Id. (citation omitted).   
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of the historical development of the policy of the remand provisions, the practical 
application of the ‘joined and served’ provision by district courts in recent decades, 
and common sense.”140  Interestingly, the court turned to Pullman Co. v. Jenkins,141 a 
1939 United States Supreme Court case, to substantiate its position.142  
In Pullman, the Supreme Court stated in dictum “where a non-separable 
controversy involves a resident defendant . . . the fact that the resident defendant has 
not been served with process does not justify removal by the non-resident 
defendant.”143  The Court reasoned that although a nonresident defendant joined in 
the action may be prejudiced because the resident defendant may not ever be served, 
the non-resident defendant should not be entitled to “seize an opportunity to remove 
the cause before service upon the resident co-defendant is effected.”144  Sullivan 
regarded this discussion as illustrative of the competing policy goals omnipresent in 
the pre-service removal issue.145  That is, “whether ‘the non-resident defendant may 
be prejudiced because his co-defendant may not [ever] be served,’ and preventing 
the non-resident defendant from seizing the ‘opportunity to remove the cause before 
service upon the resident co-defendant is effected.’”146  It concluded that the 
Supreme Court clearly chose to further the latter policy with its decision in 
Pullman.147  Thus, the court viewed its futile probe into section 1441(b)’s legislative 
history as a positive.  The dearth of legislative intent signaled that Congress did not 
add “the properly joined and served” language to reverse the Pullman Court’s 
opposition to removal prior to service.148  
Sullivan then set forth several additional arguments in support of its contention 
that pre-service removal is an absurd result.149  First, the court argued that 
conditioning the validity of the forum-defendant rule on a race to see which party 
can either serve or remove before the other is “absurd on its face”150 and “serves no 
conceivable policy goal.”151  Next, it believed a plain meaning application would 
destroy “the plaintiff’s rightful position as ‘master of his or her complaint.’”152  The 
court also worried that defendants “could always avoid the imposition of the forum 
defendant rule so long as they monitor the court docket and remove the action to 
                                                          
 
140
 Id.  
 
141
 Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534 (1939).  
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 Sullivan, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 644.  
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 Pullman, 305 U.S. at 541.  
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 Sullivan, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 644. 
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 Id. (quoting Pullman, 305 U.S. at 541).  
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 Id. at 645. 
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 See id. at 645-47.  
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 Id. at 647. 
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federal court before the plaintiff can effect service of process.”153  This “procedural 
anomaly,” it argued, threatened to strip the forum-defendant rule of any practical 
significance.154  Finally, the court characterized the practice of pre-service removal 
as a form of defendant “gamesmanship.”155  Since it was “abundantly clear”156 that 
the “properly joined and served” language was added by Congress to prevent 
plaintiff gamesmanship,157 it would be demonstrably at odds with congressional 
intent to then allow “defendants to engage another type of gamesmanship—a hasty 
filing of a notice of removal” before service of the in-state defendant.158  
2.  Motion to Remand Denied 
a.  The Plain Language Argument 
Pre-service removal is proper under the plain language argument because the 
forum-defendant rule, by its text, permits removal of a diverse case when an in-state 
defendant is not properly joined and served.159  The district courts that favor this 
argument maintain it is their duty to give conclusive effect to the plain or 
unambiguous language of any statute.160 And because these courts find the “properly 
joined and served” language of the forum-defendant rule unambiguous,161 the 
plaintiff’s motion to remand the case back to state court is denied.  These courts 
acknowledge the policy arguments against pre-service removal are compelling, but 
ultimately insufficient to overcome the binding rules of statutory interpretation.162  
Thomson v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals163 and Bivins v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals164 
are two recent examples of the plain language cases. 
In Thomson, the plaintiffs, residents of Georgia, filed an eight-count complaint 
against the defendants in the Superior Court of New Jersey on December 19, 2006.165  
The defendants, all affiliates of Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation (“Novartis”), 
maintained their principal place of business in New Jersey.166  After filing the 
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 See supra note 138.  
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 Sullivan, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 647.  
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 See cases cited supra note 98. 
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 Thomson v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 06-6280, 2007 WL 1521138 (D.N.J. May 22, 
2007). 
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 Bivins v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 09-1087, 2009 WL 2496518 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 
2009). 
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 Thomson, 2007 WL 1521138, at *1. 
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 Id. 
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lawsuit, the plaintiffs attempted to serve Novartis on December 22, 2006, but the 
Novartis office was closed.167  They tried again on four other occasions: December 
26, 27, 28, and 29.168  Each time the plaintiff’s process server was denied because 
nobody was present to accept service on behalf of Novartis due to the fact that the 
company was closed for the holidays.169  
On December 29, 2006, Novartis removed the action to federal court based on 
diversity jurisdiction.170 At that time, the plaintiffs had not served any of the 
defendants.171  Novartis maintained they were not aware of the plaintiff’s attempts to 
serve process and had received a copy of the complaint on December 28, 2006 from 
a private docketing service.172  On January 2, 2007, after the case was removed, the 
plaintiffs finally served Novartis.173  
Upon notification that its case had been removed to federal court, the plaintiffs 
filed a motion to remand, arguing that removal by Novartis, a resident of the forum 
state, is prohibited by the forum-defendant rule.174  In addition, because they had not 
served any of the defendants at the time of removal, the plaintiffs further argued that 
the court should apply the no-defendant-served exception set forth in Holmstrom.175  
Additionally, the plaintiffs raised policy arguments characterizing the practice of 
pre-service removal as an absurd result.176  Novartis countered by arguing that a 
plain reading of the “properly joined and served” language of the forum-defendant 
rule sanctions removal so long as the resident defendant had not been served at the 
time of removal.177  
Ruling on the plaintiff’s motion to remand, the court asserted that its duty when 
interpreting statutory language is to “give effect to the will of Congress, and where 
its will has been expressed in reasonably plain terms, that language must ordinarily 
be regarded as conclusive.”178  Under this standard, then, the court asserted that pre-
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 Id. at *2. 
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 Id. 
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 Id. 
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 Id.  
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 Id. at *3.  
 
176
 Id. at *4.  Addressing the plaintiff’s policy arguments against pre-service removal, the 
court reasoned: 
Plaintiffs do raise colorable policy arguments that it is unjust that a properly joined 
defendant could monitor state court dockets and remove cases prior to being served, 
and that it makes little sense to provide a federal forum to an in-state defendant upon 
removal of a diversity case, since state courts are certainly as adept as federal courts in 
applying state law. 
Id. 
 
177
 Id. at *3. 
 
178
 Id. at *4 (quotations and citations omitted). 
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service removal is permitted.179  It reasoned that the “properly joined and served” 
language was unambiguous; it plainly requires an in-state defendant to be “served” 
before removal is prohibited.180  Furthermore, the court characterized the plaintiffs 
policy arguments as “colorable” but insufficient to overcome the court’s duty to give 
meaning to the statute’s plain language.181  The court therefore denied the plaintiff’s 
motion to remand, holding that Novartis had properly removed the case to federal 
court.182 
In its opinion, the Thomson court noted, “there is no evidence that Novartis was 
actively avoiding service.”183  This seems to suggest that the plain language 
argument does have its limits.  If a plaintiff were able to prove that a defendant 
actively avoided service and then removed the case to federal court, the “properly 
joined and served” language would not protect the defendant. Under those 
circumstances, the court would likely characterize the outcome as an absurd result 
and grant the plaintiff’s motion to remand the case back to state court.  As 
mentioned, there was no evidence in Thomson, however, that Novartis actively 
avoided service from the plaintiff.184  
A more recent decision out of the plain language courts is Bivins v. Novartis 
Pharmaceuticals.185  The procedural and factual circumstances in Bivins are almost 
identical to Thomson and all other pre-service removal cases.186  The Bivins case is 
interesting, however, because both parties relied on earlier decisions from the New 
Jersey district court to support their respective positions.  The plaintiff cited to 
Sullivan as controlling and the defendant relied on Thomson.187  
The Bivins court, like Thomson, found the statutory language of the forum-
defendant rule clear and unambiguous.188  It too held that removal is only prohibited 
                                                          
 
179
 Id.  
 
180
 Id. 
 
181
 Id. 
 
182
 Id.  
 
183
 Id. 
 
184
 Id. 
 
185
 Bivins v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 09-1087, 2009 WL 2496518 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 
2009). 
  
186
 On March 4, 2009, the plaintiff, a citizen of Texas, filed a lawsuit against Novartis, a 
corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey.  Id. at *1.  The complaint was 
filed in the Superior Court of New Jersey.  Id.  It alleged injuries that resulted from using a 
Novartis product.  Id.  On March 10, 2009, Novartis removed the case to federal court under 
diversity jurisdiction before the plaintiff could serve any of the defendants.  Id.  After serving 
Novartis, the plaintiff moved the court to remand the case back to state court.  Id.  It argued 
that the presence of an in-state defendant, Novartis, “violated the ‘forum defendant rule’ 
contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).”  Id.  The defendant countered with the plain language 
argument, insisting removal was proper since it was not served at the time of removal.  Id. 
 
187
 Id. at *1 (“Both plaintiff and [Novartis] cite decisions within this District to support 
their positions.” (citing Sullivan v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 640, 643-47 
(D.N.J. 2008) (finding removal was improper); Thomson, 2007 WL 1521138, at *4 (finding 
removal was proper))).  
 
188
 Id. at *2.   
19Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010
926 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:907 
 
when an in-state defendant has been “properly joined and served.”189  In so doing, 
the court rejected the holding in Sullivan.190  It was reluctant to look past the plain 
language of the forum-defendant rule in the “absence of an ‘extraordinary showing 
of a contrary congressional intent in the legislative history.’”191  Thus, the failure of 
the Sullivan court to show any actual congressional intent in support of its holding 
was fatal to the plaintiffs in Bivins.192  Accordingly, the court dismissed the 
plaintiff’s policy arguments as insufficient to overcome the binding rules of statutory 
interpretation.193  Bivins concluded, “‘if congress intends a different result, it is up to 
Congress rather than the courts to fix it.’”194  
The plaintiff in Bivins later filed a second motion to remand based on new 
facts.195  The new facts presented by the plaintiff were completed service of process 
on October 12, 2009, 216 days after Novartis filed for removal.196  The plaintiff 
argued that removal was now improper under the forum-defendant rule because 
Novartis was “properly joined and served.”197  The court stated that it had a duty to 
“decide a motion to remand upon the facts present at the time the petition for 
removal from state to federal court is filed.”198  And because Novartis was not 
“served” at the time of the petition for removal, the plaintiff “fail[ed] to present any 
new information that would . . . [provide] a legal or factual basis for finding removal 
improper.”199  The court thus rejected the plaintiff’s argument and denied the second 
motion to remand.200 
IV.  CRITICIZING THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST PRE-SERVICE REMOVAL 
A.  Revisiting the No-Defendant-Served Exception 
The no-defendant-served exception to pre-service removal is founded on the 
theory that the “properly joined and served” language was included in the statute to 
protect non-forum defendants from plaintiffs who defeat diversity jurisdiction by 
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fraudulently joining in-state defendants, whom they never actually serve nor intend 
to proceed against.201  Therefore, that language does not apply when the plaintiff has 
yet to initiate service of process on any of the named defendants.  The rationalization 
for this exception suffers from a number of weaknesses.  
First, the actual text of the forum-defendant rule does not support the theory that 
the “properly joined and served” language only applies under certain circumstances.  
It simply states that “[a]ny other such action shall be removable only if none of the 
parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in 
which such action is brought.”202  Nowhere in this provision does it say or even 
imply that the applicability of the “properly joined and served” requirement is 
subject to the condition that the removing party has been served.  Furthermore, there 
is no evidence that Congress intended these words to be dependent upon service of 
the removing party.203  Therefore, the courts employing this exception have 
essentially deleted the “and served” language from the forum-defendant rule.  
Additionally, the theory that the “properly joined and served” language was 
added to prevent fraudulent joinder is founded upon a presumption.  Although the 
words “properly joined” clearly support this argument, there is simply no evidence 
that Congress intended the “and served” portion as anything other than an additional 
requirement, exclusive of the joinder requirement.204  It is difficult, then, to accept an 
interpretation of the forum-defendant rule that ignores certain words contained 
therein based on an assumption of congressional intent.  
Finally, the Holmstrom court relied upon the holding in Murphy Bros. to 
illustrate that the in-state defendant and non-forum defendant(s) stand on equal 
footing since neither has been served.205  In that case, the Supreme Court held that 
the 30-day removal period does not start running against named defendants until 
they have been formally served.206  In support of that holding, the Court reasoned 
that “an individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in 
litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by 
formal process.”207  Some plaintiffs in pre-service removal cases have maintained 
that Murphy Bros. established a service prerequisite for removal.208  Under this 
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argument, pre-service removal is improper because the removing defendant was not 
yet legally permitted to engage in any form of litigation.  Although the Holmstorm 
court stopped short of making that argument itself, that interpretation of the holding 
in Murphy Bros. is not accurate.   
The key word in the Murphy Bros. holding is the word “obliged.”  In this 
context, “obliged” simply means that a party is not legally required to engage in 
litigation until formally served.  A party may still engage in litigation, however, if it 
so chooses.  Therefore, a defendant can still legally file a notice of removal under 
section 1446(b) before it is served.  The Court therefore stopped short of 
“superimpos[ing] a service requirement on Section 1446(b)” in Murphy Bros.209  
As mentioned, the Holmstrom court does not explicitly rely on this misconstrued 
interpretation of Murphy Bros.210  In any case, the no-defendant-served exception 
ultimately fails for other reasons. Specifically, it fails because the language of the 
forum-defendant rule does not support its underlying theory that the “properly joined 
and served” requirement is dependent upon the foregoing service of the removing 
defendant and because it is rooted in presumed congressional intent.  For these 
reasons, the district courts should not employ the no-defendant-served exception to 
avoid pre-service removal.  
B.  Revisiting the Absurd-Result Argument  
The absurd-result argument against pre-service removal also suffers from 
inherent flaws in its rationalization.  First, the argument that a “literal application of 
[the forum defendant rule] . . . would both produce bizarre results that Congress 
could not have intended, and results that are demonstrably at odds with objectives 
Congress did not intend to effect,”211 also relies upon presumed congressional 
intent.212  The act of “look[ing] beyond the language of the statute . . . to give effect 
to the purpose of the forum defendant rule and the ‘properly joined and served’ 
language,”213 likewise is justified by the same unfounded presumption of what 
Congress intended those words to mean.214  The fact remains that there is no concrete 
evidence to support any theory that Congress added the “properly joined and served” 
language to the statute other than to preclude diversity jurisdiction removal when an 
in-state defendant has been “properly joined and served.”215  Therefore, district 
courts should not rely on mere speculation to justify ignoring the plain language of 
the forum-defendant rule.  
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Additionally, some courts favoring remand have found support in the 1939 
Supreme Court case Pullman Co. v. Jenkins.216  They argue this case promulgates the 
Supreme Court’s stance on the issue of pre-service removal.217  Specifically, reliance 
is placed on the Pullman Court’s reasoning that although a nonresident defendant 
joined in the action may be prejudiced because the resident defendant may not ever 
be served, the nonresident defendant should not be entitled to “seize an opportunity 
to remove the cause before service upon the resident co-defendant is effected.”218  
Despite this seemingly applicable dictum from the Pullman case, one court ruling in 
favor of pre-service removal has argued that these courts have “taken Pullman out of 
context when citing it as supporting or binding precedent for their holdings.”219  This 
potential misconstruction of Pullman therefore weakens the position that the 
Supreme Court necessarily is against pre-service removal.  
The absurd-result courts also set forth a number of policy arguments to support 
their characterization of pre-service removal as such.  They argue that conditioning 
the validity of the forum-defendant rule on the timing of service of process serves 
“no conceivable public policy goal.”220  They also maintain that allowing pre-service 
removal would “eviscerate the purpose of the forum defendant rule and a plaintiff’s 
well-established right to choice of forum.”221  Lastly, these courts characterize pre-
service removal as a form of litigant gamesmanship.222  They argue that Congress 
added the “properly joined and served” language to the forum-defendant rule to 
prevent plaintiffs from engaging in gamesmanship by fraudulently joining in-state 
defendants to defeat diversity jurisdiction.223  Therefore, because Congress has 
already condemned one form of litigant gamesmanship under the forum-defendant 
rule, allowing pre-service removal, another form of gamesmanship, would be an 
absurd result.  
The absurd-result argument suffers from the fact that prior “[c]ases using or 
referring to the principle do not define absurdity, nor do they specify the kinds of 
situations where the principle should be applied.”224  This lack of clarity makes it 
difficult to draw the line between an absurd result and one that is merely 
objectionable.  Therefore, courts that employ the absurd-result argument do so 
without having to satisfy a strict standard.  Considering the power that this principle 
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carries,225 it is debatable whether the standard should be so lenient.  As such, pre-
service removal, while potentially objectionable, might not rise to the level of 
outrage that would warrant the use of the absurd-result principle.  To support this 
conclusion, it is worth revisiting the outcome in United States v. Kirby.226 
In that case, a sheriff was charged for violating a statute that proscribed any 
activity obstructing the delivery of mail when it arrested a mailman who was 
indicted for murder.227  It was clear to the Court that Congress could not have 
intended to include that particular result in the statute.228  Otherwise, mailmen would 
be free to commit crimes because no sheriff would want to risk arresting them for 
fear of violating the statute.  Kirby cited to other examples of absurd results to 
analogize its own conclusion.  For instance, “‘that whoever drew blood in the streets 
should be punished with the utmost severity,’ did not extend to the surgeon who 
opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street in a fit.”229  Furthermore, 
“that a prisoner who breaks prison shall be guilty of felony, does not extend to a 
prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on fire—‘for he is not to be hanged 
because he would not stay to be burnt.’”230  
The results above were all wildly unreasonable and illogical.  Moreover, an 
innocent person in each situation would have been incarcerated and deprived of their 
freedoms without the operation of the absurd-result principle.  Conversely, pre-
service removal does not result in the criminal detention of an innocent person. 
Rather, it deprives a plaintiff from litigating their case in state court.  While this right 
is no doubt important, it is questionable whether it warrants the use of the absurd-
result principle.  Perhaps if the behavior by the defendant were a bit more egregious, 
such as actively avoiding service from the plaintiff before removing,231 then use of 
the principle would be justified.  Accordingly, the district courts facing this issue in 
the future would be better served by allowing Congress to remedy this result if it 
sees fit.  Otherwise, the standard for employing the principle is further relaxed and 
we could see an increase in the frequency of judges reading particular words out of a 
statute.  Under that scenario, separation of powers issues could arise with 
accusations of judges legislating from the bench.  
V.  ARGUING FOR PRE-SERVICE REMOVAL 
The plain language argument in favor of pre-service removal, unlike those 
against it, rests on straightforward reasoning.  First, the general rules of statutory 
interpretation maintain that where the language of a statute is clear and 
unambiguous, the courts should give those words their plain meaning when applying 
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that law.232  Blacks Law Dictionary defines the term “ambiguity” as “[a]n 
uncertainty of meaning or intention, as in a contractual term or statutory 
provision.”233  To argue that the term “served,” as used in the context of the forum-
defendant rule, is susceptible to “uncertainty of meaning or intention” does not hold 
up.  
Congress, by adding the words “properly joined and served” to the forum-
defendant rule, arguably chose to condition the applicability of the removal 
prohibition contained therein upon proper joinder and service of the in-state 
defendant.  Furthermore, there is no evidence that Congress, in its legislative history 
or otherwise, intended the service requirement to apply only under certain 
circumstances.234  Thus, the plain meaning of those words must be conclusive.  
Moreover, allowing pre-service removal under the plain language of the forum-
defendant rule is a result consistent with the Supreme Court’s position on statutory 
interpretation as set forth in Exxon v. Allapatah.235 
Concededly, pre-service removal is a loophole that has emerged as a result of 
antiquated statutory language drafted at a time when electronic docket monitoring 
and other modern methods of case-notification were not foreseeable.  However, that 
fact alone does not make pre-service removal an absurd result.  Consequently, courts 
should not be permitted to modify the forum-defendant rule by eliminating the words 
“and served” from its text.  As the Supreme Court declared in Exxon, “‘if Congress 
intends a different result, it is up to Congress rather than the courts to fix it.’”236 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
On its face, a dispute over whether a case is litigated in state court or federal 
court seems trivial.  One might also characterize the pre-service removal dispute as 
wasteful of judicial resources.  Nevertheless, a closer look at the effects removal can 
have on the outcome of a case reveals the importance of this issue.  For instance, one 
article suggested that by removal, “defeats the plaintiff’s forum advantage . . . [by] 
dislodging the plaintiff’s lawyer from a familiar and favored forum . . . reversing the 
various biases, costs and other kinds of inconveniences, disparities in court quality, 
and differences in procedural law that led the plaintiff to prefer state court.”237  
Additionally, the statistics show that win rates for plaintiffs in removed cases are 
very low.238  Therefore, the outcome of a motion to remand will, at the very least, 
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modify “the parties’ respective postures for settlement negotiations . . . if the motion 
to remand is denied, when plaintiffs may suddenly find themselves with a weak case 
for recovery.”239  
Litigants on both sides ultimately would stand to benefit from the guidance of the 
appellate courts on this issue.  That guidance, however, is far off because “orders 
remanding cases are ordinarily not reviewable on appeal,”240 and “orders denying 
motions to remand aren’t reviewable until a judgment is entered, which may not 
happen for years, if ever.”241  The district courts therefore should alleviate some of 
the confusion surrounding this issue by reaching a consistent and proper resolution.  
For the reasons set forth above, allowing pre-service removal under the plain 
language of the forum-defendant rule is the proper resolution of this issue.  
 
                                                          
34%) . . . .”); id. (citing Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 237, at 581 (“Plaintiffs’ win rates 
in removed cases are very low, compared to cases brought originally in federal court and to 
state cases.  For example, our data reveal that the win rate in original diversity cases is 71%, 
but in removed diversity cases it is only 34%.”))). 
 
239
 Richardson, supra note 238, at 182-83. 
 
240
 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (2006).  
 
241
 Pre-Service Removals: They Keep on Coming, DRUG AND DEVICE LAW (May 11, 2009, 
8:00 AM), http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com. 
26https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss4/7
